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1. Introduction 
In recent years much attention has been devoted to the diffusion and 
adoption processes of new information and communication technologies (ICTs). 
The interest in these technologies is originating from the importance they 
have assumed in the process of defining competitive advantages among firms 
and comparative advantage among regions. 
The aim of the present paper is to offer analytical and policy issues to be 
investigated by way of a research agenda - ra ther than to present results of 
completed research - on diffusion (and adoption) processes of information and 
communication technologies. This agenda is a resul t of a broader strategie 
research project, in which the primary subject of study is the phenomenon 
of network externality, and i'ts effects on the performance of firms and 
regions. This concept has recently been introduced by industrial economists 
as the main explanation of diffusion processes of interrelated technologies. 
The basic idea at the basis of all studies dealing with network externalities is 
that the rate of growth in the demand for interrelated technologies is 
dependent on the number of subscribers or clients already using that 
specific technology. 
From this simple, yet fundamental, observation a series of theoretical and 
empirical analyses have foliowed, trying to conceptualise and prove 
empirically the significance of network externalities. Up to now, the concept 
has been widely studied and applied, especially with a view on measuring the 
impact that it has on the utility function of each subscriber or cliënt. In 
essence, the basic concept sterns from the strong interdependence which 
exists in the utility function of each potential subscriber to join the network, 
making the decision highly dependent on the behaviour of others. 
The concept of network externality has been applied in a number of 
different research fields, so that at first sight the literature on network 
externalities suggests that many issues have been analysed under the label 
"network externality", which in reality are very different from one another in 
their nature and in the consequences they provoke on the market s t ruc ture . 
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The paper is sub-divided into two par ts . The first part is devoted to the 
analysis of the network externality concept and to the way it has been 
covered in the economie literature. This par t is useful for both providing 
the reader with a s t ructural framework of the li terature on network 
externality and identifying the still uncovered field of research on which our 
study will mainly concentrate its attention. 
The second par t is primarily devoted to present the first conceptual and 
methodological approaches to this as yet unexplored field of research, dealing 
mainly with the impact that network externalities have on the industrial and 
regional performance. In particular, our main research question addresses the 
question whether network externalities provoke an increase in the 
productivity of firms and regions. More precisely, this second issue will t ry 
to answer the question whether: 
- network externalities can be measured at the industrial performance level; 
- network externalities can be measured at the regional performance level; 
- regions have the possibility to gain from these network externalities. 
These questions which have not been tackled before deserve no doubt much 
more theoretical and empirical reflection. In the light of the previous remarks, 
the second par t of the paper provides a conceptual framework (Section 3), a 
mathematical model (Section 4), a methodological approach to network 
externalities measurement (Section 5) and a research framework for a future 
applied research in this field (Section 6). 
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2 . The Concept of Network Externality 
Since 1974 with Rohlf's paper on network externality, this concept has become 
the subject of many studies interpret ing it as a fundamental and strategie 
issue in the diffusion of new technologies (Allen, 1988 and 1989; Antonelli 1989 
and 1992; Bental and Spiegel, 1990; Cabral and Leite, 1989; David, 1985 and 
1991; Hayashi, 1991; Katz and Shapiro, 1985; Markus, 1989). 
The name "network externality" sterns from the well known economie concept 
of externality. In economie theory an externality is said to exist when an 
external person to a transaction is directly affected (positively or negatively) 
by the events of the transaction. 
The concept of "network externality" is related to a simple but fundamental 
observation tha t the user-value of a network is highly dependent on the 
number of already existing subscribers or clients. This means that the choice 
for a potential user to become a member of the network is dependent upon the 
already existing number of subscribers or clients. This basic but crucial 
statement has s t rong implications not only on the development trajectories of 
new networks, but also on some crucial elements such as tariff s t ructure, 
network interconnections, standardisation processes, optimal dimensions of 
networks and internetwork competition. In other words, the existence of 
network externality has some far reaching consequences for the actual 
operation and policy choices regarding networks. The notion of network 
externality is t hus essentially related to the value of the network, depending 
on the already existing number of subscribers . This (varying) benefit of a 
network for a cliënt is thus different from the given cost of access to the 
network for the advantage which an individual receives and does not pay once 
he joins the network. 
From this perspective network externalities are the economie motive for the 
adoption of and entry to the network and are becoming the essential 
explanation for the diffusion of new interrelated technologies. Firms' decisions 
to join a new network depend primarily on the number of already existing 
subscr ibers in the network and not solely on the cost of purchasing the 
technology itself. 
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The previous observations can be illustrated by the supply- demand curve in 
Figure 1. In this figure, the individual demand curve on the market, labeled D 
(apparent), represents the benefits that subscr ibers receive from joining the 
network. These benefits are fully paid by the subscribers via the tariff 
system of a telecommunication network. If the individual demand, D (apparent), 
is interpreted in this way, it is too low since not all benefits subscribers can 
achieve by joining the network are properly represented. The higher demand 
curve D (real) takes into account the non-paid advantages subscribers receive 
joining the network, i.e. network externalities are taken into account, thus 
P* shifting the equilibrium point from qg to qj , representing the intersection 
point between demand (real) and supply. 
The new price Pj is higher than P*, because it is the result of the initial 
market price of the service (P*) and all value- added effects of producing the 
marginal unit of the service, i.e. the aggregate users value of the new 
subscriber. Thus Pj reads as: 
Pj = P* + Se 
where Se is the new subscr iber ' s effects on the network value. 
It is clear that optimal output requires an expansion of market output from 
qg to q j at which point marginal cost is equal to marginal social benefit. 
The market equilibrium is in this case "disturbed" by the existence of a 
positive consumption network externality. The diagram in Figure 1 is drawn on 
the basis of an infinite technological capacity of the network, which justifies 
the steadily increasing profit for suppliers with additional consumers. Clearly 
in case of fixed networks (i.e. networks with constant technological capacity), 
sorae strong negative consumption network externalities may arise because the 
quality of Communications and the rate of failing contacts are affected by 
congestion (Amiel and Rochet, 1987). In the presence of network externality in 
a market equilibrium, network solutions are non-optimal, the market may fail, 
and resourse allocation implications arise. 
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Fig. 1. The effects of nclwork externalies on market cquilibrium 
Volume of service 
used by an individual 
(intensityof use) 
Source: Hayashi. 1992 
The telecommunication industry seems to offer the most appropriate context 
for studing network externalities and all economie consequences they provoke. 
The telecommunication system is in fact characterised by some strategie 
features, which can explain the existence of network externality, namely: 
a) interdependence of consumer's utility, since the choice of a person to 
join the network is dependent on the behaviour of other clients; 
b) interdependence between potential adopters and users of a new 
technology. since the latter may create for the former a reduction of 
search costs and market prices for complementary inputs, maintenance 
and skills stemming from their experience in using the technology already 
adopted, through dynamic learning processes; 
c) interdependence between potential users and suppliers. On the one 
hand, the know-how and the experience accumulated by suppliers acts as 
a driving force in the adoption process. In fact, the adopting firms are 
facilitated in the search for know-how and complementary inputs (i.e. 
organisational strategies) thanks to precise "guidelines" provided by the 
suppliers. On the other hand, the higher the number of adopters, the 
broader the know-how of the supply will be. In other words, the 
relationship between supply and demand generates cross-learning 
processes, via the bridging between demand needs and supply knowledge; 
d) interdependence between producers of complementary technical 
components and products in the telecommunication "filiere". The 
interrelation of sub-markets may provoke externalities, since the profit 
function of a producer is influenced by the economie transactions of other 
producers whose behaviour 
affects the market prices of intermediary inputs; 
e) interdependence between use r s ' productivity, since the advantages 
obtained by a firm on its productivity are dependent on the number of 
already networked firms. In fact, the advantages obtained through the use 
and exploitation of these technologies are a function of the number of 
firms already using them. 
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While the first three features affect the utility function of a final individual 
user, the last two act on the productivity of firms, the telecommunication 
service acting as an input factor in the production function. Moreover, these 
features are related to both telecommunication manufacturing firms and 
service providers (the telecommunication production sphere) and to the 
adopting firms using these technologies as final or intermediate products (the 
telecommunication use sphere) . 
Figure 2 presents a typology of network externalities on the basis of the 
previous telecommunication market features. In the top-left quadrant of Figure 
2, network externalities are related to the telecommunication adopters and are 
the typical consumption network externalities acting on the utility function of 
an individual final user. Here the interdependence among utility functions of 
users of telecommunication networks is at the basis of the traditional network 
externality concept. Telecommunication demand is more and more explained 
through interrelated decision making processes of adopters, a situation which 
influences the growth rate of the telecommunication demand. 
A well-known example of consumption network externalities is the so called 
hardware/software paradigm (Katz and Shapiro, 1985 and 1986), regarding the 
strong interdependent preferences dominating the choice of a consumer to buy 
a certain kind of hardware. In the words of Katz and Shapiro (1985, p. 424): 
".... an agent purchasing a personal computer will be concerned 
with the number of other agents purchasing similar hardware, 
because the amount and variety of software which will be supplied 
for use with a given computer is likely to be an increasing 
function of the number of hardware units that have been sold". 
Also in this case, the benefit that a consumer derives from the use of a good 
is an increasing function of the number and behaviour of other consumers, in 
this case the fact that they buy compatible items. 
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figure 2 
A Typology of Nelvrork Externalities 
Telecommunication 
use . 
Consumption network 
externalities 
Uülily 
(final use) 
Adoption externalities 
Learning processes 
Pecuniary network 
externalities 
Technical network 
externalities 
Productivity 
(interraediate use) 
Filière economies 
Teleeommunicalion 
production 
At the users side, another kind of network externalities is present, which is 
called in the l i terature adoption externalities (Antonelli, 1992). In the diffusion 
processes of these technologies a crucial role is also played by collective 
learning processes, like in all cases of complex technologies. Again, these 
processes seem to hide a sort of network externality mechanism, because of 
non-paid advantages that potential users of the technology gain from the 
experience of old adopters. For potential adopters, non-paid advantages may 
emerge from lower search costs of complementary inputs , or from specific 
know-how on how to use and maintain the technology, stemming from 
Consolidated experience on the use of these technologies accumulated by 
previous adopters. 
However, these features, recently interpreted as an externality mechanism 
(Antonelli, 1992; David, 1992), may be in reality only explained through the 
traditional concept of dynamic learning processes, similar for their effects, but 
different in nature from the traditional concept of network externalities. 
Learning processes stem in fact from the concept of dynamic economies of 
scale (Spence, 1981), while network externalities stem from the non-paid 
benefits obtained by interdependent mechanisms. 
The same can be said for the case of telecommunication product firms actirig 
on the utility function of telecommunication users through cross-learning 
processes (bottom-left quadrant) . Again, users benefit from these learning 
processes, through dynamic economies of scale, which are different in nature 
from the concept of network externalities. 
Network externalities in the telecommunication sector do not only affect the 
final user , by impacting on his utility function. In the telecommunication 
industry also the intermediate user (or supplier) acts under certain particular 
features (bottom-right quadrant) . 
As far as the telecommunication technologies production is concerned, 
telecommunication networks are built upon an array of interrelated technical 
components such as terminals, transmission facilities and switching equipments, 
as well as intermediate outputs in the extremely complex telecommunication 
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"filiere". The interrelation exists both in vertical relationships (intermediate 
inputs for telecommunication outputs) as well as in horizontal final products 
markets (advanced terminals whose development stimulates value added 
services such as Minitel, and electronic mail). 
In both horizontal and vertical interrelationships the behaviour on the market 
of each economie agent (reduction of prices, new market niches) affects 
positively the profits of the other interconnected producers, generating what 
can be interpreted as network externalities. However, these kinds of 
advantages are typical filiere economies. stemming from a vertical integration 
in a sector. In other words these advantages may be associated with 
traditional "economies of scale" generated in a vertically or horizontally strong 
market relationship (bottom-right quadrant in Figure 2). 
Another extremely appropriate example of these kinds of "fili_£, re" economies 
is presented by the hardware/software industry. Computers (hardware) and 
programs (software) have t o b e used together, and the greater the sales of 
the hardware, the higher the profits for software producers will be, via the 
technical interconnectivity of the two markets. 
Finally, an interesting situation concerns the interdependence among 
productivity of different intermediate users . In this case, we can again speak 
of network externalities, this time related to the use of the service as an 
input factor for other products, thus having an impact on the productivity 
Ie vel of firms (top-right quadrant in Figure 2). In this framework, both the 
concept of pecuniary (network) externalities (Scitovsky. 1954) and technical 
(network) externalities (Meade, 1954) may be useful. Pecuniary externalities are 
provoked whenever the profits of one producer are affected by the actions of 
other producers. In other words, pecuniary externalities act on input factors 
decreasing their costs and thus having positive effects on the output. This 
category differs from the "technological external economies", defined by Meade 
(1954) as those advantages obtained by a firm on its output through the non 
paid exploitation of the output and input factors belonging to other firms. The 
latter category sees external economies as a peculiarity of the production 
function, i.e. these external economies act on input factors productivity. 
Through the increase in the input productivity these external economies 
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influence positively the corporate output. 
For telecommunication network users , the use of the network generates an 
increase in input productivity (or profit advantages), only partially covered 
by the costs of joining the network. The non-paid advantages obtained by a 
subscriber joining a network provoke unintended positive effects on the 
economie performance of the new subscriber . Thus, if network externalities 
represent the (economie) motive for entering the network, a better economie 
performance of firms is the (economie) effect they produce at the productivity 
side. 
From the above observations we conclude that in the ICT sector the concept 
of network externality is to be related only to telecommunication (final or 
intermediate) users (in Figure 2 only the upper part). In recent years, the 
broad definition given to network externalities has expanded it towards 
network externalities in the production sphere (manufacturing firms and 
service providers) , thus losing the precise meaning of the concept and 
substi tuting it for more traditional economie concepts. 
While consumption network externalities in the context of the use of 
telecommunications (top-left quadrant) , as well as adoption externalities 
(learning processes) (bottom-left quadrant) and "filiere" economies (bottom-
right quadrant) have been widely identified and analysed in the li terature, a 
still unexplored field of study is the measurement of the effects of network 
externalities on the productivity side. The non-paid advantages of users 
joining a network are reflected in the performance of these subscribers , via 
the reduction of input factor costs or the increase in their productivity. 
These kinds of network externalities have not or hardly been explored, and 
neither the effects they generate. This is the area addressed in the paper by 
providing a conceptual and methodological framework for dealing with the 
basic strategie question whether firms and regions can gain from network 
externalities effect. 
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3. Industrial and Spatial Performance of Network Externalities 
Our basic research questions are related to the linkage between network 
externalities and industrial and regional performance. In particular, our main 
task is the analysis of the question whether or not network externalities may 
be measured in terms of industrial (i.e. micro-meso) and regional (i.e. meso-
macro) performance. Such a research question is fraught with many empirical 
difficulties of a methodological nature, to be dealt with in the next section. At 
the purely conceptual level however it is easier to envisage a positive 
relationship between network externalities and the corporate output. 
The access to a network and the non-paid advantages a firm gets by joining 
the network play a crucial role in the performance of firms, primarily via an 
increase in productivity. This assumption is evident, since a firm may obtain 
advantages from being networked, without paying for it a marginal price. 
These advantages may be classified in terms of direct and indirect 
advantages. The definition of direct advantages is related to the fact that the 
advantages a firm gets via a network directly affect (positively) the 
productivity of a firm: more synergies among actors (in a static perspective), 
and the achievement of new markets (in a dynamic perspective). Other 
advantages may be achieved via a network, which indirectly affect the 
productivity of firms: information provision induced via network 
interconnection (in a static perspective), and complementary assets (in a 
dynamic perspective). All these advantages are generated by the existence of a 
physical linkage on the network, by means of what we call "positive network 
externalities". These advantages are expected to generate, directly or 
indirectly, a positive effect on the performance of firms. 
The achievement of a higher economie performance by exploiting benefits 
derived from joining a network is what we call an "economie symbiosis" effect. 
The capabilities of exploiting these advantages is far from being equal among 
firms and is mainly dependent on the way these technologies are used. Firms 
can in fact achieve a status of cooperation via a network, which means the 
exploitation of mutual reciprocal network externalities. Nevertheless, it is also 
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possible that a different kind of relationship is established, more dependent on 
a hierarchical s t ructure among firms, which could generate a sort of 
dependency of a firm to another, and a certain kind of "exploitation" takes 
place. In this case, a unilateral network externality effect is generated. 
Thus, an interesting question in network analysis is the identification and 
definition of those firms which are more able to exploit network externalities. 
In other words, distributive effects of network externalities among users is an 
interesting aspect to be invastigated. 
Our framework is based on many studies which have been developed on the 
basic idea that technological change and innovation are the main driving 
forces for the improvement of firms performance, via an increase in 
productivity (Stoneman, 1983 and 1992). All l i terature dealing with innovation 
diffusion processes captures the linkage between innovation and better 
performance, although it is still fair to state that the majority of the empirical 
work on this topic has not yet caught up with theoretical advances. 
Although there may be similarities in effects reflecting a better performance 
of firms, the causes or main reasons for this phenomenon may have completely 
different origins and a completely different nature. Without denying the 
existence of other driving forces improving the performance of firms (i.e. 
international market developments, better marketing strategies, e t c ) , the 
present paper aims to focus only on one distinct cause of increased 
performance, viz. the network externality phenomenon. 
At the conceptual level, the framework res ts thus on the assumption that the 
main micro-stimulus explaining adoption processes of advanced 
telecommunication technologies is the existence of network externalities (Figure 
3). Our analytical framework proceeds then, by assuming that even regions can 
benefit from network externalities effects. In fact, the basic idea is that the 
existence and exploitation of network externalities are not confined to the firm 
level. In fact, the presence in a region of firms being able to exploit the 
advantages of network externalities for their performance determines - in 
aggregate terms - the positive effects on regional performance, a phenomenon 
we will call spatial symbiosis. 
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Fig. 3 Conceptual Framework 
Micro- stimulus 
Nelwork externalities 
Micro response 
Performance of firms 
Macro response 
Regional performance 
The spatial symbiosis is interpreted as the (non zero) sum of the (positive) 
effects on the firms performance generated by firms through the exploitation 
of network externalities. The positive effects at a firm's level, in fact, are 
expected to reflect their positive influence at the level of the environment in 
which they perform. Thus, in economie terms we expect a region to have the 
possibility to gain from network externalities, by exploiting (non-paid) 
advantages stemming from its participation in the network. At a macro level 
these advantages may be described as the achievement of: 
a) spatially dispersed information; 
b) new geographic market areas; 
c) complementary know-how from different specialised economie areas; 
d) additional specialised input factors from other regions. 
As is the case at the firm level, also at the macro level the capability of 
exploiting the spatial symbiosis is not equally distributed. Essentially, a 
spatially varying capability of exploiting network externalities of firms can be 
ascribed to two components, namely the s t ructura l component and the 
production milieu component. 
These two elements have in recent studies been identified as the main issues 
for the explanation of different degrees of regional innovativeness (Davelaar, 
1991). To a certain extent the same approach can be developed for the analysis 
of the different spatial capacities of receptivity. i.e. the capacity of 
"advantages appropriability". We may argue that the spatial symbiosis is 
highly dependent on the extent to which: 
a) firms and sectors in a region are able to exploit network externalities. 
In other words, the regional structural component of firms and sectors 
with a high capacity of exploiting the economie symbiosis will be one of the 
critical determinants of the spatial symbiosis; 
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b) the local (spatial) capacities to exploit network externalities. In fact, the 
so called "production milieu component" plays a role in the definition of 
the spatial symbiosis. Identical firms, in fact, can be able to exploit 
network externalities in different ways, according to their location in 
space. 
The traditional macro conditions presented by the literature as explanatory 
factors for a region to be more innovative than another may be only partially 
applied here. Davelaar (1991) points out four clusters of "production milieu" 
variables in his explanatory framework of regional and spatial incubation 
analysis: 
a) agglomeration of (different types of) firms, from which the possibility to 
exploit agglomeration economies depends; 
b) demography and population s t ructure , i.e. the "market area" or the 
s t ruc ture of the labour market; 
c) information infrastructure, which guarantees to the area the availability 
of information, a situation always thought of as an important stimulus for 
the generation and adoption of information; 
d) physical and institutional infrastructure. The presence of public 
infrastructure, such as modern t ransport and telecommunication networks, 
have always been thought of as important factors for the innovativeness 
of a region. 
The "production milieu" variables related to the development of the spatial 
symbiosis have to be identified precisely in those spatial variables defining 
both the adoption processes and - especially - the exploitation processes of 
these technologies. These macro conditions are expected to be: 
a) agglomeration of different innovative firms. In this case the willingness 
to imitate and to "copy" the innovative use of new technologies from 
already innovative firms is stimulated. Moreover, the spatial clustering of 
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firms gaining market shares for the exploitation of network-based 
innovations may also turn out to lead to the attainment of a higher share 
of the market; 
b) the population s t ructure . As for the degree of innovativeness in 
general, also the innovative use in a region depends on the labour market 
present in the area, and on related traditional spin-off effects which can 
facilitate learning processes on the use of new technologies among firms; 
c) the presence of a firms' service sector. Instead of underlining the 
importance of the information infrastructure, in the case of the 
exploitation of the new telecommunication networks and services the 
existence of consultancy firms for organisational aspects becomes crucial, 
because of the high degree of organisational changes required for a firm 
once advanced telecommunication technologies are exploited in an innovative 
way. The cohesion and interrelation between technology and organisation 
is in fact of strategie importance in order to exploit new technologies in 
an innovative way, and not jus t to introducé them as substitution means of 
old technologies. 
It is in central areas that the above macro-conditions are usually present, as 
is suggested by much literature. In fact, central areas can exploit: 
a) an advanced labour market, in terms of technical, managerial and 
organisational know-how and capacity to innovate; 
b) collective learning processes tha t enhance the capacities to exploit 
network externalities, through learning processes in the use and 
exploitation of these technologies; 
c) a wide service market, especially corporate organisational consultancies, 
becoming crucial for the integration of new ICTs with the organisational 
s t ruc ture of firms, and - at the territorial level- with the "vocations 
industrielies" of the area. 
Seen from a static perspective, spatial symbiosis would be exploited by 
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central areas, which are more likely to be the seedbed areas for the location 
of innovative firms (structural component) and more local economie 
characteristics justifying their bet ter capacities to exploit network externalities 
(production milieu component). 
The above concepts of "economie symbiosis" and "spatial symbiosis" show 
some similarity to older concepts of "growth poles" (Perroux, 1954) and 
"growth centres" (Boudeville, 1968), respectively. A growth pole was supposed 
to operate in an economie network space (without a clear reference to its 
geographic location), whereas a growth centre was regarded as a geographical 
concentration of economie activities as a result of agglomeration economies. 
Both explained regional and spatial development start ing from the consideration 
of a "key" production unit generating a set of polarisation and development 
effects, via Keynesian income multiplier effects, direct and indirect input-otput 
effects, and spatial advantage effects. 
Although our framework suggests that a set of polarisation and development 
effects arises via the physical linkage of firms, the original causes of the 
generation of multiplier effects are of different nature. While the "growth 
pole" theory defines the reasons of development in the existence of key 
production units generating a set of attractive factors, in the spatial symbiosis 
approach the cause of generation of these development effects is the physical 
ICT connection with other firms. This relation, in fact, generates a set of 
synergies, via exchanges of know-how and information, which improve the 
productivity of networked firms. At the aggregate level, greater productivity 
of firms located in the same region is measured in terms of a bet ter aggregate 
performance. When the linkage takes place at an inter-regional level, the 
effects it produces may also be reflected in import and export implications. 
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4. A Theoretical Model for Network Externalities Measurement 
In this section we will present a theoretical model for network externalities 
measurement. In order to prove the validity of the "economie and spatial 
symbiosis" framework, it is in fact of fundamental importance to find a 
methodology able to raeasure network externalities on corporate and regional 
performance. Our idea is to develop a theoretical model acting as a bridge 
between our conceptual assumptions and our empirical analysis. In fact, from 
this theoretical model some crucial statements are highlighted, which have to 
be proved empirically. The model deals with a situation of mrket equilibrium 
in the presence of network externalities affecting the final output. 
In the theoretical model we introducé the concept of "connectivity index". 
The degree of benefits received from a network externality is highly 
dependent, by definition, on the physical connectivity among firms. Thus, a 
connectivity index is of crucial importance in the analysis. A way of 
measuring this index with the help of graph theory is presented in section 5. 
4.1. An equilibrium model with network externalities 
The traditional model of cost minimisation under the assumption of a given 
output allows us to find the optimal mix of production factors K and L, 
minimising costs for a given output. In this section we introducé the 
assumption that firms may benefit from network externalities through a 
physical linkage with other firms. The hypotheses on which our model res ts 
are the following: 
a) there are only two symmetrie firms in the market, acting simultaneously 
on the market. These firms are symmetrie, i.e. their position in the market 
is similar; 
b) the advantages firms get from being networked are embodied in more 
information received via the network. The network externality concept is 
present in our model by assuming that the volume of information firm A 
receives is dependent not only on the investments that firm A bears for 
being networked, but also on the investments undertaken by firm B. Thus, 
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t h e volume of information firm A r e c e i v e s is more t h a n t h e marginal cos t s 
firm A p a y s for having access to t h e marginal information uni t . 
The p roduc t ion funct ion of firm A is t h e n , 
< -' *r Lf >f (i> 
where 7^ r e p r e s e n t s t h e connect iv i ty index of firm A, being a 7j funct ion of 
what firm A i h v e s t s in the network and wha t firm B i n v e s t s in t h e ne twork . If 
we assume a l inear relat ion between t h e i nves tmen t s in a ne twork and the 
connec t iv i ty index, we end up by hav ing t h e fllowing l inear equat ion in 7^: 
TA = *A NA + «„ NB ( 2 ) 
u n d e r t h e assumpt ion t h a t «A > «g, b e c a u s e i t is p lausible to expec t t h a t t h e 
i nves tmen t prof i tabi l i ty in y^ is h i g h e r for firm A t h a n for firm B. 
c) a t h i r d c ruc ia l hypo thes i s is r e l a t e d to t h e cost funct ion. Unit cos t s of 
ne twork ing (Cj^ for firm A) are a funct ion of y^: 
% : F ( V (3) 
I t is rea l i s t ic to expec t a decreas ing r e l a t i onsh ip be tween u n i t cos t s and y^. 
Because of l e a r n i n g p rocesses and cumula t ive exper ience in t h e use of t h e 
ne twork , margina l cos t s decrease if connec t iv i t y i nc rease s . The re will be of 
c o u r s e a level of fixed cos t s (Cy). The c o s t funct ion of ne twork ing is t h u s : 
< 4 ) 
c „ - — 
The i n t e r e s t i n g ques t ion a t th i s po in t is to find t h e new levels of K, L, and 
Y ,^ g u a r a n t e e i n g t h e minimisation of c o s t s for firm A. The solution method is 
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similar to the traditional model of micro-economie production theory, taking 
into account the new production and costs functions. Firm A has the aim of 
minimising cost function, subject to a given production level: 
min CA (K, L, y) = Cy ^ + ^ LA f CRA [yj ^ ( 5 ) 
* -" L? yf = 0 (6) s . t . qA - v KA - k 
If we solve it using the Lagrangian function, we obtain 
^ P x q* o ( ? ) 
^ = C Ï A - X « - = 0 
*L qA ( 8 ) 
SL -h4kh 4A _ x 8 _ 4 _ _ = 0 (9) 
k (% NA + 4 N)2 («NA + « NB) ( f NA + <$ NB) 
* k - * „tr« T ^ » 
^ = ** - '
K A LA \ = ° (10) 
The solution of these equations determines the level of K, L and N 
guaranteeting the maximisation of profits: 
(11) 
11 
h 0 LA 
Cl oc 
h oc K* 
q e 
(12) 
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* *. < 1 3 > 
A
 - 1 
a CLA L A 
These levels of K, L and N represent the mix of the three production factors 
that guarantee the minimisation of costs for firm A. The difference with the 
traditional model is that the level of connectivity does not only depend on the 
choices of firm A, but also by what firm B decides. I n fact the level of 
investment on a network NA. is dependent also on the level of investments 
born by firm B. The present Sj is found with no respect for the choice of firm 
B. Thus, this means that, firm A minimises its production costs without taking 
into consideration the strategie choices of firm B. Because firm B behaves 
rationally, it will also have the same aim of firm A and will fix its mix of 
production factors at the level guaranteeing its costs minimisation. Firm B will 
change the level of investment in a network, Ng, until this level guarantees a 
profit maximisation. If firm B changes the level of N3, this decision influences 
the level of fy. Firm A will be obliged to reallocate its production function until 
the level of A guarantees a simultaneous costs minimisation for both firms A 
and B. Thus, 
TA = «i N * + ifc N* (14) 
where N, and N„ are minimum. A B 
This represents a Cournot equilibrium, where the two firms simultaneously 
achieve a profit maximisation. If one firm does not achieve the optimum 
solution, it could be inclined to reallocate i ts production factors in favour of a 
cost minimisation. This will oblige the other firm to change its equilibrium 
point. The game finds a stable solution only when both firms simultaneously 
achieve a cost minimisation point, given by the levels of K, L and 7 defined 
before. 
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This theoretical approach shows some interesting implications for the 
existence of network externalities: 
1) if the quantity of labour and capital decreases, the level of investment in 
the newtork increases; 
2) if the level of investment in the network developed by firm B increases, the 
quantity of labour (or of capital) of firm A decreases, for a fixed level of 
investment in the network. 
To verify our economie symbiosis framework, the first attempt is to see 
whether these relationships between network investments and quantity of 
capital and labour are true. Moreover, it is our aim to develop the same model 
for a sequential game where two asymmetrie firms are present. 
In this section we have spoken about a connectivity index, which enters the 
production function as a new input. In the next section we will present a way 
of measuring this index. 
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5. A Methodological Approach to Network Externalities Measurement 
5.1. Connectivity and nëtwork externalities at a firm level 
In order to demonstrate the validity of the "economie and spatial symbiosis" 
model, it is of fundamental importance to develop a methodology that is able to 
measure network externalities effects on the performance of firms and regions. 
Up to now the concept of network externalities has been explained in terms 
of the positive and increasingly intensive relation between the number of 
subscribers and the performance of firms. The higher the number of 
subscribers , the higher the interest of a firm to join a network, and thus the 
better the effects on its performance. In reality, this definition is far too 
broad to explain the concept of network externality. In a static perspective 
the interest of a firm is not to join the highest possible number of firms 
connected via the network, but only the highest number of firms directly or 
indirectly related to the business activities of the firm. Thus, the decision of 
joining the network is not related to the number of firms already networked, 
but by the number of specific business-related firms already present in the 
network. The most obvious reason for entering a network is, in reality, the 
possibility of contacting relevant groups such as suppliers, customers or 
horizontally related firms in a more efficiënt and quicker way. 
Connectivity is in fact a measure of a linkage between two or more firms in a 
network. The economie connectivity measures the economie relationships among 
firms. When these relationships are mediated via a telecommunication network, 
then we can also speak of physical connectivity. What we argue here is that 
there is a s t rong relationship between these two kinds of connectivity; in 
particular physical connectivity has no ground to exist if economie 
connectivity does not exist. 
Figure 4 is a schematic representation of physical connectivity with the use 
of graph theory. If we represent firms as nodes, or vertices, and the physical 
linkages among them as arches, or edges, the outcome is a (undirected) graph 
of vertices and edges representing all potential physical communication (or 
contact) lines that firms can entertain among themselves. 
As we have jus t mentioned, the real interest of firms, in a static world, is 
not to be linked to all other possible subscr ibers , but to achieve full 
connectivity among firms related to its business. If we represent in our graph 
these firms with a bold vertex, and their economie relationships with bold 
22 
Fig. 4. Undirected graph representing connectivity 
among firms 
Legend: Q Firms 
Business-related firms 
Normal lines: possible physical conneclions 
among firms 
Bold lines: physical and economie conneclions 
among specific "business-relaled firms" 
edges, the real matrix of first order relationships will emerge. With this matrix 
it is possible to measure the proportion of real physical connectivity of a 
certain firm with regard to potential $9C£2 economie connectivity. 
The physical connectivity is what generates network externalities. If the 
benefits a firm receives from physical connectivity is an increasing function 
of connectivity itself, then positive network externalities exist, a situation 
represented by the positive derivative of the benefit function (Figure 5). Thus 
so far we have described a way of measuring network externalities under the 
assumption of a static world. Figure 5 represents now a possible way of 
measuring static network externalities. 
If we remove the assumption of a static situation, the potential linkages that 
firms are offered via a telecommunication network become of crucial 
importance. In fact, in a dynamic perspective, the interest of firms is not only 
to achieve static efficiency by developing better and quicker economie 
relationships with the already existing suppliers and customers. The purpose 
and aim of networking is related to the exploitation of other economie 
advantages, namely: 
a) the achievement of new markets; 
b) the development of product and process innovation, with the 
achievement of new and complementary technical, managerial and 
organisational know-how 
e) the control on the development trajectories of the strategie 
complementary know-how, by mantaining and increasing all strategie 
information sources; 
d) the achievement of higher quality in the intermediate products provided 
by suppliers, creating more competition among them , by increasing their 
number. 
In order to achieve these economie advantages, the increase in the degree of 
physical connectivity is the crucial vehicle for establishing new economie 
relationships, by achieving a higher degree of integration among economie 
agents. The exploitation of dynamic network externalities is in this case 
dependent on firms' expectations about the degree of "cooperation" or 
complementarity of other firms. If they expect that other firms will be willing 
to cooperate, then the degree of physical connectivity will increase, and, 
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''ig. 5 Increasing relaLionship bclwcen the degree of 
connectivily and corpora te and regional 
performance: posilive network externalities 
Corporate and regional 
performance 
Degree of conneclivity 
consequently, the benefits that firms receive from their connectivity. 
Related to the exploitation of dynamic network externalities is the problem of 
competition among distinct and exclusive networks. Examples are for instance 
telex and telefax networks. Apart from going through a normal product life 
cycle, their evolution depends also on the intensity of use by other clients 
(i.e., the potential access a network offers to designated part ies of a firm). 
(see also Rietvelt and al., 1992). This also raises the issue of compatibility of 
the technology of the network. If networks cannot be made compatible, they 
are by definition competitors and are facing fierce competition to their 
introduction and market penetration. It is an important issue to identify the 
degree of mutual openness of two "exclusive networks". The critical point is to 
define whether it is more convenient for an exclusive network to open the 
access to the members of other exclusive networks. The advantage of achieving 
a new information source is reciprocal in case of a compatibility of two former 
closed networks and thus the decision depends on the willingness to lose 
unique acccess to strategie information compared to the willingness to achieve 
new information. 
An illustrative example is presented by the case of the flower network in the 
Netherlands, which is providing all strategie information on export market etc. 
to all flower suppliers who are a member. A great problem is now presented 
by the possibility of linking the national Dutch network to flower data base 
networks in other countries. The competitive behaviour of monopolising 
information is in contrast with the cooperative behaviour of joining a larger 
network with more competitors, but also bet ter international market access. 
The final decision of free access to a network depends on two kinds of 
expectations: 
a) expectations on the role that firms already belonging to the network will 
play on the market. The stronger the firms are, the higher the degree of 
openness. In this case the already existing firms are expecting to play 
essentially a role of winner in a wider network; 
b) expectations of the already existing firms in the network on the 
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behaviour of firms which do not yet belong to the network. In this case, if 
expectations are linked to a competitive behaviour, ra ther than to a 
cooperative one, the possibility of opening the network is ra ther low. 
In a dynaraic context it is not always t rue that the higher the connectivity, 
the higher the benefits a firm can get. The explanations are twofold. The first 
reason is that in a dynamic context, power relationships have still to be 
defined between firms with new relationships and the uncertainty about the 
economie power relationship which will be defined does not allow for the 
definition of the advantages one can get by being linked to a network. The 
second reason is that network externalities exist, if a business relation is 
established before the physical linkage among the two firms. Like in the static 
case network externalities are in fact generated by connectivity, where this 
connectivity is the result of an economie interest rather than a pure physical 
communication possibility. 
5.2. Connectivity and network externality at a regional level 
In the previous section we have suggested a methodological approach to the 
measurement of economie symbiosis. For the sake of coherence in our analysis 
section 5.2 will be devoted to the explanation of the methodology for measuring 
the effect that network externalities have on the regional performance. The 
approach is the same as the one for the economie symbiosis, i.e. the 
identification of a connectivity index, representing the relationships that firms 
have within that region and with firms in other regions. Using the same logic 
as in the case of the firm level, the connectivity among firms within the same 
region and outside can be measured by means of graph theory. A positive 
derivative between the connectivity index and the regional performance would 
explain the existence of network externalities effects. 
With the use of this method, the idea is to measure the relationship between 
network externalities and regional development. We may then envisage some 
plausible resul ts , in the sense that the spatial symbiosis is expected to be 
higher: 
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- among regions of different economie development. Especially in the case of 
backward regions, the effects of network externalities on regional 
performance are intensive if the linkage is with advanced regions, since the 
linkage with these regions may fill the gap of local missing resources; 
- among regions with advanced development, since synergies emerge from 
the exploitation of complementary inputs; from economies of scale or scope 
stemming from the cooperation in a market and from the achievement of a 
critical mass to afford financially heavy innovation projects. 
In the case of both the corporate and the regional level, various analysis 
questions remain on some methodological aspects. 
The first open question is related to the measurement of network externalities 
via a connectivity index which measures only direct connections. In other 
words, only first order connectivity is measured via our method, while second 
and higher order connectivity linkages are not taken into account. The choice 
of measuring a first order connectivity index requires in reality a careful 
choice. Second and third order connectivity loses the straightforward impact 
first order connectivity has on the production function, because the most 
strategie relationships which matter on the productivity of a firm are the 
direct relationships with suppliers and customers. Direct relationships among 
suppliers or customers of the same firm, representing what we call second and 
higher order connectivity for that firm, do not have the same direct relation 
with the performance of that firm. 
A second open question which arises from the method we presented to 
measure network externalities is that a connectivity index does not take into 
account the intensity of information flows. While in the case of the first 
question we might disregard the importance of indirect connections of a firm 
on its performance, in the second case it is more difficult to avoid the 
problera. The intensity of use of a network, and not only its access, has 
inevitably an impact on the corporate performance. 
26 
The intensity of flows between regions may in principle be measured with the 
use of spatial interaction models, such as gravity models, represented by two 
principal nodes, and by a factor measuring the obstacles raised by the 
distance between the two locations: 
T.. = K . W. . W. . f ( c . ) 
i j i j U 
where: 
T..: measure of the interaction between i and j 
i j 
W.: potential size node i 
W.: potential size node j 
f(c..): cost of interaction between i and j 
U 
This model is defined as a meso/macro level. In the case of physical 
connectivity via a telecommunication network between two regions, the cost of 
interaction is represented by both entry costs and use costs of the network. 
These costs explain why, although by definition network externalities generate 
greater performance, there still might be a low intensity of use of a network. 
A logic explanation of this behaviour is represented by transaction costs which 
have to be born, being measured in terms of entry costs and users costs 
(phychological, financial, e t c ) . Shadow costs of the transaction, i.e. all costs 
which have to be born in a transaction process towards the adoption and use 
of these technologies, can in this case be measured and used as a measure of 
costs of interaction between regions. This model might be helpful especially at 
the spatial network level, but it cannot be used for the firm's behaviour. In 
most cases, the description of a firm to join and to use a network is of a 
discrete nature, so that - in case of a sufficiënt micro data base on firm 
behaviour - also discrete choice models can be used. Such models are 
compatible with spatial interaction models at a meso/macro level (see Nijkamp 
and Reggiani, 1992). 
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6. Conclusions: A Research Agenda for the Future 
The present paper provides a first effort to offer a framework for the 
definition and measurement of network externalities on corporate and regional 
performance. Clearly, much work still needs to be done. The research agenda 
for the future requires an empirical analysis of the above methodological 
approach to the measurement of network externality. 
For this purpose, at present an empirical analysis is carried out, regarding 
the evaluation of the so called STAR project of the European Community. This 
project is devoted to the implementation of advanced telecommunication 
technologies in the less developed regions of the Community. The empirical 
investigation is now trying to look at the impact that the implementation of 
advanced telecommunication technologies have in Southern Italy in terms of 
both the competitiveness of local firms and the regional development. Data are 
collected via a survey questionnaire on the adoption processes and advantages 
in small and medium firms in Southern Italy. In a more general setting, the 
idea is to ca r ry out an evaluation of the effects that the development of 
advanced telecommunication technologies have provoked on the less developed 
regions of the Community. 
The empirical analysis is carried out through in-depth interviews with 
corporate users , with a s tructured questionnaire. 
The logic s t ruc ture of the questionnaire is presented in Figure 6, where the 
underlying logical framework of the empirical analysis is summarised. The first 
idea is to t es t whether the micro stimulus generating the adoption process may 
be associated with the network externalities effect. For this purpose, the first 
pa r t of the questionnaire deals with the reasons and bottlenecks for the 
adoption of these technologies. The degree of adoption leads to the 
identification of the degree of physical connectivity of that particular firm, 
and to the possible identification of a connectivity index (representing the 
proportion of the real connectivity on the potential connectivity). 
The following par t of the analysis deals with the economie advantages 
obtained by these firms from the use of these advanced telecommunication 
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Fig. 6 Slruclure of an iCT Impact AnalyaiB of 
Economie and Spatia] Symbiosis 
Reasons for ^ 
DefiniiioD of 
micro 
stimuli 
fe. Economie 
adoption W W Advantages 
1 f V 
Degree of 
physical 
conneclivity 
Performance 
index 
Connectivily 
index 
T 
technologies and services in terms of more economie relationships with other 
firms, and in terms of bet ter economie performance. If a positive relationship 
is envisaged between the connectivity index and the economie advantages of a 
firm, network externalities have an incidence on the dynamics of the economie 
and regional performance. 
This kind of empirical analysis is relevant for two reasons. The first reason 
is the as yet very low level of adoption of these advanced technologies. This 
helps the measurement of network externalities as the motive for entering the 
networks, since the concept of network externality is especially influencing the 
first phases of the adoption process. In the first phases of development, the 
network externality phenomenon is more easily emerging and measurable. 
A second reason for this choice is that this project is devoted to the 
development of advanced telecommunication technologies in the most backward 
regions of the Community, with the aim of inducing regional and local 
sustainable development. The evaluation of the real effects of ICTs on the 
regional development is more evident and more realistic to perform than in 
more developed regions, where the marginal benefits on corporate and regional 
competitiveness are surely more limited. 
It goes without saying that still much work needs to be done, especially in 
terms of the definition of r ight performance and connectivity indices and of a 
more developed theoretical model for measuring network externalities. Once 
these problems have been overcome, it is more easy to move towards further 
empirical results testing our conceptual frame of analysis. 
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